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7 Preserving privacy
in a digital age
Lessons of comparative
constitutionalism
David Cole
7.1 Introduction
Like so much else, privacy these days is not what it used to be. In November
2012, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, David Petraeus, a much-
decorated four-star general, resigned when a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) inquiry into anonymous email threats to a woman in Tampa, Florida,
disclosed, in the "Drafts" folder of a joint Gmail account, that Petraeus was
having an affair with his biographer. The latter had sent the threatening
emails to the Tampa woman in a jealous pique. The FBI investigation
included examination of some 30,000 pages of emails, and also revealed
potentially inappropriate emails between the recipient of the threats and
GeneralJohn Allen, the United States' (US) top commander in Afghanistan.
The military launched a public investigation of Allen's allegedly "flirtatious"
emails, which ultimately cleared him of any wrongdoing - but not before he
and his correspondent's names were dragged through the media mud. In the
"old days", such affairs and flirtations would have left no such electronic trail,
in all likelihood would never have been discovered, and would have been
deniable if they were. No longer.
In October 2012, the New York Times reported that the campaigns of
President Barack Obama and his challenger, Mitt Romney, were using
sophisticated data-mining tools to access detailed information about poten
tial voters, in order to target their appeals. It reported that:
[C]onsultants to both campaigns said they had bought demographic data
from companies that study details like voters' shopping histories, gam
bling tendencies, interest in get-rich-quick schemes, dating preferences
and financial problems. The campaigns themselves, according to cam
paign employees, have examined voters' online exchanges and social
networks to see what they care about and whom they know. They have
also authorized tests to see if, say, a phone call from a distant cousin or a
new friend would be more likely to prompt the urge to cast a ballot.
The campaigns have planted software known as cookies on voters'
computers to see if they frequent evangelical or erotic websites for clues
to their moral perspectives. Voters who visit religious websites might be
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greeted with religion-friendly messages when they return to mittromney.
com or barackobama.com. The campaigns' consultants have run experi
ments to determine if embarrassing someone for not voting by sending
letters to their neighbors or posting their voting histories online is effective.1
In the modern age, we increasingly live our lives through, and accompa
nied by, digital media. Virtually every transaction or communication that
uses such media, as well as every move ofmobile phone owners, is recorded.
Computers are able to store, transmit, and analyze the data as never before,
drawing on multiple sources to construct an intimate picture of our interests,
contacts, travels and desires. Private data-mining services, most often used
for commercial advertising purposes, can determine: what we read, listen to,
and look at; where we travel to, shop, and dine; and with whom we speak or
associate. Meanwhile, social networking sites such as Facebook encourage
individuals to broadcast their personal lives to ever-increasing networks of
"friends". Privacy, many pundits declare, is dead.
The legal consequences of these developments largely remain to be
worked out, as technology has advanced much more rapidly than the law.
Courts have begun to confront the implications of new technology, as police
and prosecutors increasingly rely on such tools to guide their investigations
and make their cases.2 Americanmobile phone service providers reported that,
in 2011 alone, they responded to over 1.3 million requests from law enforce
ment for mobile phone data, including text messages, location data, and sub
scriber information.3 From 2005 to 2010 British public authorities made
2.7 million requests for communications data to private service providers.4
How should the law adapt to the new reality of this digital age?
In 2012, the US Supreme Court (USSCt) issued what could be one of its
most important privacy decisions in decades, as it took up one version of this
issue - namely, whether police use of a global positioning system (GPS)
device to monitor the public movements of a car for a month amounted to a
search subject to constitutional constraints. The case of United States v Jones
{Jones) generated a surprising unanimous decision concluding that the prohi
bition on unreasonable searches in the Fourth Amendment to the US
Constitution was implicated, but the justices were sharply divided in their
reasoning.5 Some justices looked back to notions of property to find that the
police action was a search; others looked forward, warning that technology
enables the police to invade privacy in ways unheard of when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. That division of reasoning and outlook is emblem
atic of the uncertainty that new technology has created for the constitutional
law of privacy.
As Chapter 9 by Federico Fabbrini and Mathias Vermeulen in this volume
ably discusses at length, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
addressed virtually the same issue two years earlier in Uzun v Germany
{Uzun).6 The ECtHR, like the USSCt, affirmed that the use of such technol
ogy invaded the right to respect for private life, guaranteed by art 8 of the
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR).7 It ruled, however, that in the instant case, the interfer
ence was justified for a number of reasons: the crimes under investigation
were serious; the authorities had tried other, less intrusive means of surveil
lance, but the targets had frustrated those efforts (by, for example, disabling
a radio transmitter found in a friend's car before the GPS was installed) ; and
the law contained a number of safeguards and checks, including the possible
remedy of exclusion of the evidence from a criminal trial if it was found to
have been obtained illegally.
That the USSCt and the ECtHR reached similar conclusions with respect
to the critical threshold issue ofwhether GPS monitoring implicates privacy
concerns suggests that reports of privacy's death are, like those of Mark
Twain's, greatly exaggerated. We remain free to adapt domestic and interna
tional protections to safeguard privacy. But adaptation will clearly be neces
sary. The challenge hardly stops at the GPS device. Widely available
technological innovations - including smart phones, unmanned aerial drones,
and computer data-mining programs - make it possible to watch citizens
more intimately and comprehensively than was remotely conceivable when
the US Constitution, or even the ECHR, was adopted. These devices give
the state the ability to follow virtually our every movement in public as well
as many in private, our every keystroke at the computer and our every elec
tronic transaction or communication.
In 1956, at the height ofMcCarthyism in the US, sociologist Edward Shils
wrote that liberal democracy demands confidentiality for its citizens and
transparency for its government.8 Today, it is the citizenry that is increasingly
transparent, while government operations are shrouded in secrecy. That
development poses a serious challenge not merely to privacy but to liberty
and democracy. Sir Thomas Erskine May's words from 1863 apply with
equal if not greater immediacy 150 years later:
Next in importance to personal freedom is immunity from suspicions
and jealous observation. Men may be without restraints upon their lib
erty; they may pass to and fro at pleasure; but if their steps are tracked
by spies and informers, their words noted down for crimination, their
associates watched as conspirators - who shall say that they are free?
Nothing is more revolting to Englishmen than the espionage which
forms part of the administrative system of continental despotisms. It
haunts men like an evil genius, chills their gaiety, restrains their wit, casts
a shadow over their friendships, and blights their domestic hearth. The
freedom of this country may be measured by its immunity from this
baleful agency.9
The question posed in both Jones and Uzun, at its most general level, con
fronts every nation in the 21st century: how should law respond to ensure
that technology does not erode privacy altogether, when computers, satellites,
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of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
the GPS monitoring ofJones' car violated the Fourth Amendment ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures. It reasoned that such extensive monitor
ing, by compiling a wealth of detail about an individual's movements, consti
tutes a search and must be justified under the Fourth Amendment. The
Obama Administration sought review in the USSCt, contending that the
monitoring obtained only public information and invaded no privacy.
Therefore, the government maintained, use of the GPS required no warrant,
no probable cause, not even any individualized suspicion ofwrongdoing.
Government lawyers were confident that theywould prevail in the USSCt,
and not without reason. The USSCt had ruled in 1983 that a police officer's
use of a radio transmitter, or beeper, to assist in trailing a car on public roads
as it traveled through the night from an airport to a house in the country
some 100 miles away was not a search, and therefore not subject to the legal
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.14 It reasoned that the beeper merely
assisted the police in capturing information that was already public - the
route of an automobile on public roads. Since this information was not pri
vate to begin with, the USSCt concluded, the driver had no "reasonable
expectation of privacy" triggering Fourth Amendment protection.
In Jones, the government argued that if using technology to monitor a car
as it travels from A to B does not invade privacy, then it also invades no
privacy to monitor a car as it travels from A to B to C to Z, and back, even
around the clock for a month. As ScaliaJ expressed the government's point
during oral argument in the USSCt, "[a] hundred times zero equals zero. If-
if there is no invasion of privacy for one day, there's no invasion of privacy
for a hundred days."15
To the surprise of many observers, the USSCt unanimously rejected the
government's argument, concluding that the use of the GPS device did con
stitute a search regulated by the Fourth Amendment. The unanimous result,
however, masked substantial disagreement among the nine justices. The case
generated three different opinions. Two, the majority opinion of ScaliaJ and
a concurrence of AlitoJ, advanced starkly different approaches to the issue.
The third opinion, by SotomayorJ, appeared to register sympathy with both
of the competing approaches, while going further to suggest the need to
rethink Fourth Amendment doctrine more systematically in the face of new
technological realities.
Justice Scalia resurrected a long-dormant Fourth Amendment doctrine
that linked privacy to property, and concluded that the attachment of the
GPS device to Jones' car was a "search" because it was a trespass for the
purposes of gathering information. The USSCt had for many years relied on
property notions in interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment but,
since 1967, it had focused instead on whether the police action invaded a
"reasonable expectation of privacy". Justice Scalia, long skeptical of that
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concept for its open-ended nature and its lack of support in the "original
understanding" of the Fourth Amendment, reasoned that in this case, no
inquiry into "reasonable expectations ofprivacy" was required because there
could be no dispute that installing a GPS device on someone else's property
is a "trespass" conducted for the purpose of gathering information. Five jus
tices joined ScaliaJ's opinion,making it the controlling opinion of the USSCt.
However, Alito J, writing for four justices, rejected ScaliaJ's resort to
notions ofproperty and trespass as outmoded and superseded by the USSCt's
adoption of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in 1967. He argued
that the focus on trespass was overly formalistic, might vary from state to
state based on local property laws and was a poor proxy for the true purpose
of the Fourth Amendment - the protection of privacy. He reasoned that
Jones had a reasonable expectation that the government would not monitor
his every movement in public around the clock for a month. It is unreason
able to expect that a single trip on a public road will remain private, but
reasonable to expect that the full pattern of one's public movements over a
month will remain private. Thus, AlitoJ sought to retain the doctrinal focus
on "expectations of privacy", but concluded that here, unlike in the case
involving a single trip, legitimate expectations of privacy had been infringed
by the scope of the information gathered.
The two justices reached the same conclusion inJones, but their approaches
would lead to different results in other cases. If the police affixed a GPS
device to a car and monitored it only for a single ride on a public street,
ScaliaJ would presumably treat that as a search because it would be a tres
pass for the purposes of gathering information. Justice Alito would not,
because he did not question the existing precedent holding that one has no
reasonable expectation that a single public trip will remain confidential. By
contrast, if the police obtained a month's worth of location data from a pri
vate company that had installed a GPS device in the car at manufacture
(such as OnStar, a GPS device in many new cars that enables emergency
responders to identify a car's precise location when an accident happens),
Alito J would presumably treat that as a search, because it constitutes the
same invasion of privacy as in Jones. Justice Scalia would not, because there
would be no trespass.
Justice Sotomayor concurred separately. She formally joined Scalia J's
approach but also seemed to endorse AlitoJ's approach. In this sense, there
may, for all practical purposes, be two majority opinions in Jones. Justice
Sotomayor called for a rethinking of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
the digital age. Perhaps most significantly, she pointed to the need to recon
sider the USSCt's "third-party disclosure" doctrine. That doctrine provides
that individuals assume the risk that any information they share with others
may be transmitted to the government by those with whom it is shared, and
therefore have no Fourth Amendment objection to the government obtain
ing that information from the "third party". On this rationale, the USSCt has
permitted the police to rummage through garbage, obtain bank records, and
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place recording wires on informants engaged in private conversations with
out any constitutional constraints. In the digital world, this principle has vast
repercussions because, unless one lives as a hermit, virtually everything one
does requires sharing information with a third party - whether it be a credit
card company, internet service provider, phone company, bank, or grocery
store. Computers make it feasible for these entities to keep accurate records
of these transactions and for the government to collect and analyze the data.
Justice Sotomayor suggested that these facts may justify revisiting that doc
trine, which has taken on implications in the digital age that were unthink
able when the doctrine was first announced.
The USSCt's efforts to confront the impact of technology on privacy, and
not simply to stand by as technology erases the private realm, are laudable.
TheJones decision may have important implications for other technologically
enhanced forms of surveillance. Justice Alito's recognition that extended
GPS monitoring invades reasonable expectations of privacy might suggest
that computer data-mining, in which the government similarly collects and
aggregates lots of otherwise unprotected information to compile a compre
hensive picture of an individual's private activities, also triggers Fourth
Amendment protection. While Fourth Amendment doctrine provides that
border searches generally enjoy litde or no constitutional protection, AlitoJ's
approach might imply that searches of laptops at the border necessitate
greater protection. Similarly, while Fourth Amendment doctrine now holds
that obtaining information from a phone company about the numbers its
users call, and how long they are connected, does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, Alito J's approach might imply that the collection of mobile
phone location tracking data deserves Fourth Amendment protection, espe
cially when used over an extended time to construct a pattern of private
activity. As with the GPS, we do not reasonably expect the government,
short of these technological advances, to be able to learn everything about us
that a laptop can reveal simply because we are crossing the border, or to be
able to learn our every move in public simply because we carry a smart
phone.Justice Sotomayor also appears to be sympathetic to such arguments.
The majority approach articulated by ScaliaJ has less potential to address
the threats posed by the digital age. It protects against intelligence gathering
techniques when they require the state to trespass on an individual's privacy.
But technology makes trespass less and less necessary in order to obtain pri
vate information. Indeed, that fact was the reason the USSCt adopted the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard in confronting electronic wire
tapping in 1967. Still, ScaliaJ's opinion is agnosticwith respect to non-trespassory
investigative tactics. And since four justices signed Alito J's opinion, and
SotomayorJ's appears to be at least as sensitive to the need to protect privacy
from new threats, this opinion might ultimately prove more influential
over time.
TheJones case, however, only scratches the surface. What sorts of adapta
tion are necessary to ensure that privacy remains a protected value in liberal
Preservingprivacy in a digital age 103
democracies? The following section will explore a number ofproposals from
constitutional scholars.
7.3 Alternatives to privacy in the modern age?
Many constitutional scholars have taken up the challenge of rethinking pri
vacy protection in the digital age. This section will review four such propos
als. Each offers important insights. In the end, however, their proposals are
insufficient to meet the challenge.
In One Nation under Surveillance, Chesterman argues convincingly that the
spectre of catastrophic terrorist attacks creates extraordinary pressure for
intrusive measures in the name of prevention; technological advances have
made the collection and analysis of vast amounts of previously private infor
mation feasible and relatively inexpensive; and, finally, in a culture trans
formed by socialmedia, in which citizens are increasingly willing to broadcast
their most private thoughts and acts, privacy may already be as outmoded as
chivalry. His concerns are well founded. In 2010 the Washington Parfreported
that:
[T]he top-secret world the government created in response to the terror
ist attacks of September 11, 2001, has become so large, so unwieldy and
so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many
people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how
many agencies do the same work.16
The Washington Post found that 1,271 government organizations and 1,931
private contractors do national security-related work and more than 845,000
people have "top-secret" security clearances. Most or all of what these indi
viduals and entities do is hidden from public view.
The statutory and administrative regulations limiting surveillance have
been substantially eased since 9/11. The Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act) allowed prosecutors to bypass estab
lished limits on criminal wiretaps and searches whenever they could say that
the investigation also involved foreign intelligence gathering.17 It expanded
the FBI's use of "national security letters", which enable its agents to obtain
credit reports, financial records, and personal internet subscriber records
without judicial supervision.18 Attorneys-GeneralJohn Ashcroft and Michael
Mukasey each watered down executive branch guidelines governing FBI
investigations after 9/1 1.19
In Chesterman's view, it is futile to put up much of a fight against the
state's collection and analysis of massive amounts of information about our
personal lives. The fears of terrorism are too deep, the technology is too
advanced and the populace has already been seduced into forfeiting its pri
vacy by Facebook and other modern conveniences. He proposes that we
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instead forge a new "social contract" setting forth the terms on which we
allow the government to use such information. But the terms he proposes are
frustratingly skeletal. Chesterman contends that intelligence should be
guided by three principles: first, that it be carried out by public authorities
rather than private contractors; second, that it be based on law; and, finally,
that it be 'consequence sensitive'. There is nothing objectionable about any
of these suggestions. Intelligence operations often involve a great deal of
discretion and judgment, and we might well prefer that they be carried out
by politically accountable government actors rather than profit-seeking pri
vate contractors. Actions guided by law are definitely better than lawlessness.
And who could be against sensitivity to consequences? But it is less clear that
such a "contract" would really solve the problems of privacy in the age of
surveillance. The devil is in the details, and Chesterman does not offer many.
Take his objection to the use of private contractors for intelligence opera
tions. He reports that 70 percent of the US intelligence budget goes to private
contractors, who on average charge twice what it would cost a government
official to do the same task. In 2005 that amounted to US$42 billion on pri
vate contractors. But certainly private contractors are appropriate for some
intelligence work, just as they are for some defence work. And the abuses by
contractors that Chesterman identifies - rendition, coercive interrogation,
and warrantless wiretapping - were also committed by public officials and
would have been just as objectionable had they been implemented exclu
sively by public authorities. At the root of each of these abuses was not
unregulated private outsourcing, but the decisions of public officials who
expressly authorized such acts.20 And while Chesterman may be right to
focus on the use rather than the collection of data, are use restrictions enough?
Ifwe give up on restricting collection, what is left of privacy? The invasion of
privacy occurs when the government gains access to information we think it
should not have; how it then uses the information is less an issue of privacy
than of other concerns, such as discrimination, retaliation, due process, and
the like. The last concerns are indisputably important, but they are not sub
stitutes for privacy itself.
Solove advocates a reconceptualization of the Fourth Amendment. He
suggests that courts should not ask whether government access to an indi
vidual's web browsing history, for example, invades a "reasonable expecta
tion of privacy", but instead whether it "causes problems of reasonable
significance" by, for example, creating the potential for government abuse.21
Any government action that poses such "problems", he argues, should be
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation by courts, regardless of its impact
on privacy. The USSCt is unlikely to look with favor on this suggestion. The
Fourth Amendment by its terms demands only that "searches and seizures"
be reasonable, not that all government action be reasonable. Solove is cor
rect that the USSCt has defined what constitutes a search too restrictively,
but inviting it to oversee all "problems of reasonable significance" is not a
sufficiently tailored alternative.
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Kerr advances what he calls an "equilibrium-adjustment" theory of the
Fourth Amendment.22 He argues that the USSCt's Fourth Amendment doc
trine, often criticized as incoherent and internally contradictory, is best
understood as an effort to maintain a fair balance between the police and
potential criminals. Where technological developments make it easier for
criminals to commit crime - as in the development of the automobile, which
facilitated robberies, smuggling, and other crimes - the USSCt adjusts Fourth
Amendment doctrine to make it easier for the police to investigate and inter
dict criminals using that technology. Thus, the USSCt created an "automo
bile exception" to its general Fourth Amendment rule that searches must be
authorized in advance by a judicial warrant.23 And, as alluded to above,
when wiretapping technology made it possible for the police to eavesdrop on
private phone conversations without trespassing on property, the USSCt
abandoned its focus on trespass and proclaimed that the Fourth Amendment
protects "reasonable expectations of privacy", even when there has been no
intrusion on a property interest.24
Kerr maintains that this theory is not only an accurate description ofwhat
the USSCt has done, but also reflects what it should do as a normative matter.
The Fourth Amendment should be interpreted so as to maintain the balance
between police and criminals that existed at what Kerr calls "year zero". This
is a purposefully vague concept that has no specific time reference, but
appears to identify the balance between the state and the citizen before it was
altered by technology. On Kerr's view, courts confronting new technological
developments should assess whether a particular development has tipped the
balance of power between the police and potential criminals in the direction
of the state or the private citizen, and "adjust" Fourth Amendment doctrine
so as to maintain the status quo.
Kerr's view contains an important insight. Privacy protections, whether
found in a constitution or an international treaty, are premised on a particu
lar state of affairs. One way of conceptualizing a court's role going forward is
indeed to interpret the law to preserve that status quo in the face of real world
developments. In some sense, that is what Alito J sought to do in his Jones
concurrence. He asked what expectations of privacy citizens would have in
the absence of GPS technology, and then concluded that because the tech
nology allowed the state to invade that expectation in ways that the police
could not realistically have done without it, its use should be treated as an
invasion of privacy triggering Fourth Amendment protections.
It is not clear how Kerr's approach differs from conventional understand
ings of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Under what some have called constitu
tional common law, courts begin with an understanding of the purposes
of the Fourth Amendment and then apply these to new factual scenarios over
time, generating a jurisprudence that builds organically on itself.25 Kerr
seeks to distinguish his approach from common law methodology by main
taining that the common law looks forward while equilibrium adjustment
looks backward. But common law necessarily also looks backward, because
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of the need to follow precedent. Because of its foundation in a constitution,
constitutional common law always looks back ultimately to the constitution
from which its authority arises.
An equally conventional approach to the Fourth Amendment describes it
as balancing the rights to privacy and liberty against law enforcement pre
rogatives. The more robust the safeguards for privacy, the more difficult it is
for the police to investigate crime. A traditional balancing approach to the
Fourth Amendment would predict, like Kerr, that where police investigative
tools become more invasive of privacy, the USSCt should strike a balance
that favors privacy; when law enforcement interests are challenged by devel
opments that make criminal activity more difficult to uncover, the USSCt
might relax constitutional constraints to preserve law enforcement interests.
Thus, it is not clear what Kerr's approach adds to the traditional conception
of Fourth Amendment balancing.
Kerr's characterization of the Fourth Amendment as preserving a certain
balance between law enforcement and criminals seems oddly out of step
with the amendment's underlying purposes. In Kerr's formulation, the Fourth
Amendment appears to be a kind of umpire in a game between cops and
robbers. But the Fourth Amendment is generally understood to protect the
privacy of the citizenry at large against all unreasonable government intru
sions. One by-product of doing so is that its rules sometimes frustrate law
enforcement, but its purpose is to protect the privacy of all, not to ensure
some concept of a "fair fight" between the police and criminals.
While both balancing and common law methodology are accurate
descriptions ofwhat the USSCt generally does in constitutional adjudication,
at least at a sufficiently high level of generality, they do not provide much
guidance as to how the balance should be struck, or the common law
adjusted, in particular circumstances. Similarly, equilibrium adjustment may
be more useful as a general descriptive account than as a normative guide.
Moreover, Kerr's concept of "year zero" is curious. If the USSCt's proper
role is to retain a certain equihbrium, should it not be the equilibrium in
place at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted? But if that is all equi
librium adjustment does, it is simply another term for originalism. If "year
zero" is not the time of adoption of the Fourth Amendment, but rather some
"state of nature" that preceded the development of technology, what basis is
there for believing that this strikes the "right" balance between law enforce
ment and privacy? There is no obvious normative reason to prefer the state
of nature. If so, then there is no reason to adjust by reference to year zero.
Finally, how does one assess whether a new development favors the police
or the criminal? Most technologies can be used for good or ill. Thus, bank
robbers can use cars to speed their getaway, much faster than they could
escape by horseback. But police can similarly use cars to increase their ability
to respond to a robbery and catch the criminals. The phone enables crimi
nals to coordinate their criminal activities more efficiently, but also enables
the police to do the same, as well as to obtain personal information about
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who an individual is talking to, how frequently, for how long, and on what
subjects. The equihbrium-adjustment theory tells us very little about how to
assess how far any particular development has taken us from the equilibrium,
much less how to adjust doctrine to offset the shift in the balance of power if
we could quantify it.
Ohm finds Kerr's theory attractive, but acknowledges that it is underspec-
ified with respect to assessing the impact of technological developments.26 As
he puts it, most technology is "dual-assistance", for it can assist both the
police and the oudaw. Ohm proposes that the courts look to empirical facts
to assess who has got the better of the deal, by examining such factors as "the
length of investigations and number of indictments".27 But this effort to spec
ify and quantify what Kerr left vague only reveals how indeterminate the
inquiry is. The length of investigations and the number of indictments will be
affected by a wide range of factors and will never be reducible to the effects
of a particular technology. Ohm's effort to render Kerr's vague equilibrium
more specific only highlights the difficulty of the task.
All four scholars recognize that one of the principal challenges facing the
USSCt and the polity in the near term is how constitutional and/or statutory
law will adapt to fast-paced developments in surveillance technology.
Technological developments threaten to leave privacy, like the eight-track
player, behind. Each scholar discussed here has accurately identified the
problem, but none offers a fully satisfactory solution. The following section
turns to comparative constitutional law to identify three developments,
inspired by other legal systems, whichmight point the way toward reforming
Fourth Amendment law in order to preserve privacy.
7.4 Resurrecting privacy in the digital era:
lessons from abroad
The conundrum of how to protect privacy in a digital age is, of course, not
limited to the US. Many constitutions and human rights treaties protect pri
vacy, or a "respect for private life", and the technological developments
described in section 7.1 of this chapter are global in effect. Doctrinal
approaches adopted by other legal systems to protect privacy may therefore
offer suggestions for how to preserve privacy that might be appropriate for
consideration in the US. There are, of course, many difficulties with trans
planting legal concepts, rules and doctrines from one system to another. At a
minimum, however, other systems' approaches suggest ideas and experi
ences that may inform the development of privacy protections in the US.
A review of other legal systems suggests at least three steps that might be
considered in the US. First, instead of treating privacy as an on/off concept
that is forfeited once any amount of sharing of information takes place, or
once an individual is in the public sphere, some systems define privacy more
expansively as encompassing the details of one's personal life that are not
commonly available to the public. This approach allows for protections even
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where private information is shared with a third party. Second, some systems
require the state to justify particularly intrusive investigative techniques by
demonstrating that less intrusive investigatory tactics were insufficient - a
sort of "least restrictive means" test. This approach might preserve privacy
where less intrusive measures serve the state's interests. Third, some legal
regimes incorporate an independent oversight body tasked to protect pri
vacy. Where, as is often the case in the national security arena, surveillance
operates largely behind closed doors, often without even belated notice to
the target of a search, such alternative safeguards may be the best that can be
afforded. Each of these approaches has the potential to keep privacy pro
tected in the face of the technological onslaught, and each is consistent with
basic Fourth Amendment principles.
7.4.1 Refiningprivacy
At least until Jones, the USSCt tended to treat privacy as close to an all-or-
nothing concept. It has jealously protected the privacy of the home and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, has protected other realms in which people reason
ably expect privacy, including workplaces, luggage, clothing, and cars.
However, the USSCt has generally treated privacy as forfeited when indi
viduals engage in conduct in public, or share information with others, even
where they have little choice but to do so. This leaves the government free in
such situations to act without any objective basis for suspicion, without any
judicial or other authorization, and free of any constitutional constraint. Even
when they were first announced, these doctrines were criticized for being
insufficiendy attentive to privacy concerns. But whatever one thought then,
the effects of these doctrines on privacy are much more severe today, when
technology has made it far easier for the government to follow and record
our every public move, and to gather, collate, and "mine" data reflecting our
every transaction with others. It is one thing to say that one loses one's expec
tation of privacy with respect to one's garbage; it is another entirely to say
that one has forfeited it with respect to every transaction recorded by a com
puter in the modern age.
Justice Alito's opinion in Jones suggests a more nuanced approach, one
that retains the USSCt's focus on "reasonable expectations of privacy", but
treats as private personal information that, absent technological innovations,
the government could not realistically obtain without extraordinary effort
(such as our precise physical location over an extended period of time). As
noted earlier, similar reasoning could undermine the "third-party disclosure"
rule; the fact that, in surfing the internet or sending email, we share informa
tion with Google should not mean that we thereby share it with the govern
ment too. The state, unlike Google, can deprive us of our liberty and is more
likely to punish dissent. Thus, sharing information with Google and the gov
ernment should be seen as qualitatively distinct acts. The way to Fourth
Amendment reform is not to abandon the concept of privacy altogether, but
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to update it, much as the USSCt did with respect to wiretapping in 1967 and
AlitoJ did with respect to GPS surveillance inJones.
Article 8 of the ECHR, which guarantees "respect for private life", sug
gests away forward. The ECtHR has construed this right to be implicated by
the government's storage and use of any information specific to an individual.28
The personal information need not be entirely private, in the sense of not
shared with anyone else. In Malone v UnitedKingdom, the ECtHR held that art
8 extended to "pen register" phone data, even though it was legitimately
recorded by the Post Office.29 Neither need it involve only information about
conduct behind closed doors. The ECtHR instead attempts to protect
a realm of "private" or "personal" information. According to the ECtHR,
"private life" is "a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition".30 It
includes "gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life",
and "a right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish
and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world".31
Far from being defeated by sharing with others, the right to private life
encompasses a "zone of interaction" with others "even in a public context".32
It is implicated by the recording of "private" or "personal" data, even when
those data are gathered in public. Thus, the ECtHR ruled that Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) monitoring and recording of an individual's attempted
suicide on a public street late at night implicated art 8.33 In short, unlike pri
vacy under the Fourth Amendment, respect for private life is not forfeited
simply because information is shared with a bank, credit card company, or
internet service provider, or that it concerns conduct carried out in public.
Private information also has Europe-wide statutory protection, guided by
the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention on Personal
Data Processing).34 The Convention applies to both governmental and pri
vate actors, and has influenced the development of national legislation pro
tecting data through much of Europe.35 That legislation sets strict limits on
the collection, storage, and use of personal data, whether or not it has been
shared with another.
Both art 8 of the ECHR and the Convention on Personal Data Processing
have spurred European nations to adopt domestic laws governing surveil
lance and personal data. For example, theUnited Kingdom's (UK) Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) - enacted to respond to an ECtHR
decision finding that the UK's electronic surveillance system was insuffi-
ciendy subject to legal limits and safeguards - regulates the covert acquisition
of any "private information", defined as "any information relating to a person's
private or family life".36 The UKHome Office's Code ofPractice specifies that
privacy concerns are likely to arise:
if several records are to be analysed together in order to establish, for
example, a pattern of behaviour, or if one or more pieces of information
[whether or not available in thepublic domain) axe covertiy (or in some cases
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overtly) obtained for the purpose ofmaking a permanent record about a
person or for subsequent data processing ... In such cases, the totality of
the information gleaned may constitute private information even if indi
vidual records do not (emphasis in original).37
As these decisions and opinions illustrate, a legal system need not treat pri
vacy as an on/off affair, but can - and in my view, should - recognize that
private details of an individual's life can be gleaned by the gathering, record
ing, collation, and analysis of hundreds of pieces of information about the
individual's purchases, travels, communications, contacts, and viewing and
reading habits. As the UK Home Office has acknowledged, the creation of a
mosaic - these days often constructed through data-mining - can turn what
might be public information when viewed in isolation, into private informa
tion when it reveals patterns of an individual's behavior that would not gen
erally be available to public authorities. In Jones, the concurring justices
similarly recognized that individual public acts, when collated over a suffi
ciently long period of time, can reveal private information. The same is true
with respect to individual transactions with others, when collated over a suf
ficiently long time and range to reveal patterns of personal behavior. This is
especially so when such patterns for all practical purposes can be generated
only through the use of computer data analysis.
It must be acknowledged that an expansion in what counts as a "reason
able expectation of privacy" might lead to some relaxation of the rules gov
erning intrusions into privacy. The USSCt inJones simply held that the use of
the GPS monitor triggered the Fourth Amendment, and then remanded the
case without deciding what the Fourth Amendment actually required in this
setting. The US government argued that, because a GPS monitor reveals only
location data, its attachment and use should require only reasonable suspi
cion, not a warrant based on probable cause. Along similar lines, the USSCt
in Terry v Ohio ruled that, because brief stops and pat-down searches are a less
intrusive form of search than a full-scale search, they are justified on grounds
of suspicion falling below probable cause and without a prior warrant.38 The
Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches, and therefore
has been interpreted to permit such flexibility. So, too, art 8(2) of the ECHR
permits intrusions into the right to respect for private life for a wide range of
"legitimate" aims. But until the USSCt recognizes that privacy is even impli
cated by such tactics as the retrieval and analysis of location and transaction
data, the government's actions need not even be "reasonable".
7.4.2 Least restrictivemeans
Computer data-mining has become, by all accounts, a very powerful tool for
developing a picture of individuals' private lives. As noted earlier, both sides
in the 2012 US presidential campaign mined such information, gleaned from
private companies, to create sophisticated profiles of voters to determine
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who they would likely favor in the race, and how they might best be
approached and persuaded to vote.
Should police, prosecutors and other government officials be permitted to
use such powerful and revealing tools where more limited intrusions might
provide them with the information they need for a particular investigation?
In some countries, courts consider, in assessing the legality of intrusive sur
veillance methods, whether the government has exhausted less intrusive
alternatives. Such an inquiry might be appropriate under the Fourth
Amendment and, indeed, has already been used in limited circumstances.
As noted already, the ECtHR upheld the GPS monitoring of Uzun, not
withstanding its infringement of Uzun's right to respect for private life, in
part because the police had first pursued less intrusive measures. The avail
ability of less intrusive alternatives might render a particular infringement on
private life not "necessary in a democratic society" as required by art 8(2) of
the ECHR
In view of the particular dangers to privacy posed by wiretapping,
Canadian law generally requires the police to show that there is "no other
reasonable method of investigation" available before they can obtain a war
rant for the interception of telephone communications.39 The Canadian
Supreme Court has referred to this "investigative necessity" requirement,
albeit in dicta, as "one of the safeguards that made it possible for this Court
to uphold [the electronic surveillance scheme] on constitutional grounds."40
Investigative necessity does not literally require a showing that wiretapping
is the "last resort", but does require more than a claim that it is the "most
efficacious" technique available.41 The state might, for example, show that
alternative methods of investigation would be dangerous or ineffective.42
There is room in Fourth Amendment law for such an inquiry. The touch
stone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness", and where less intrusive
means are readily available, a given search may not be reasonable. Thus, the
USSCt has held that seizing an airline passenger's luggage at his arrival city
for 90 minutes so that it could be brought to another airport and sniffed by
drug-sniffing dogs was unreasonable. Given the advance notice provided to
the police, the USSCt reasoned, they could have carried out the search in a
less intrusive manner by having a drug-sniffing dog available at the arrival
airport.43 Similarly, the USSCt held that, even where the police have a war
rant and probable cause justifying a search of a home, it is unreasonable to
invite the media to "ride along" on the search, as the search can be con
ducted without the added intrusion of the media.44
A strict "least restrictive means" test would involve too much judicial
intrusion on legitimate police discretion. Such an inquiry would require
courts - and police - to assess the relative intrusiveness of various methods
of surveillance. In some instances, the answer will be self-evident. Detaining
a passenger's luggage for 20 minutes is less intrusive than holding it for 90
minutes. Reading the content of emails is more intrusive than obtaining
merely the emails' "envelope" address data. But, in other situations, the
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assessments will be more subjective: is data-mining or GPS surveillance
more intrusive than round-the-clock visual surveillance, for example? Is
interception of email or web browsing history more or less intrusive than a
search of a car or luggage?
Still, the Canadian and ECtHR approaches suggest that such assessments
of the relative intrusiveness of different monitoring tactics may provide an
important constraint on the use of new technologies. Incorporating the prin
ciple into Fourth Amendment law more generally would encourage police to
internalize a "do less harm" approach to investigations. In Canada, the
"investigative necessity" requirement was imposed initially by legislation,
based on a parliamentary assessment of the particular danger that wiretap
ping poses to privacy values. Judgments about which types of investigation
might trigger such an inquiry might be more amenable to legislative than
judicial determination. But as technology makes intrusive investigative tools
readily available to police, some such restraint may be necessary ifwe are to
preserve a measure of privacy.
7.4.3 Independentprivacy agencies
or commissions
A third approach to protecting privacy in the digital age is to create independ
ent institutions whose mission it is to oversee particular investigative tools and
practices with the goal of ensuring fidelity to privacy values. The gold stand
ard for doing so is the Fourth Amendment requirement that judges authorize
searches based on objective showings of "probable cause" that the investiga
tion will reveal evidence of a crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant
based on probable cause is presumptively required to render a search reason
able - subject to a long list of categorical exceptions. But individualized prior
judicial authorization is not always possible, or necessary. Where it is not pos
sible, some sort of ex post review may provide an important safeguard.
Lawsuits for damages and individual complaints are one form of ex post
review, but there are multiple obstacles to such avenues for relief. In the US,
for example, immunity doctrines for government defendants frequendy defeat
after-the-fact challenges to unconstitutional searches and seizures. Moreover,
many searches, particularly in the national security field, are conducted in
secret and without notice to the affected individuals. In such situations, review
by an independent commission may be the best that can be done.
Independent privacy agencies or commissioners can also perform a valu
able function in the formulation of rules and regulations governing particular
investigative techniques. The rules governing investigations are almost always
constructed by agencies and officials charged primarily with criminal law
enforcement and national security, and are therefore likely to reflect their
biases. Where, as is increasingly the case, the technology is complicated, out
strips public awareness and is to some degree secret, public comment and over
sight may be radically limited in practice. Creating agencies or commissioners
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independent of the national security and law enforcement bureaucracy, with a
focus on monitoring new technologies for privacy concerns, may encourage
the informed input of privacy values into the initial architecture of such
programs.
Such entities are common in Europe, particularly in the realm of data col
lection.45 As Francesca Bignami notes, their authorities and responsibilities
vary:
[B]ut most . . . have the power to review proposed laws and regulations
with a data protection impact, to conduct inspections of private and
public data processors, and to commence administrative proceedings
against violators which may result in injunctive orders or administrative
fines.46
Where they detect criminal law violations, they can often bring prosecutions
or refer cases to prosecutors.47
Canada has also adopted such an approach. Thus, in legislation creating
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) and empower
ing it to intercept overseas communications, the Canadian Parliament cre
ated the position of a CSEC Commissioner, who must be a former judge, to
review the implementation of the legislation and to report annually to
Parliament.48 An independent commission or commissioner is no panacea,
however. The UK, for example, has made ex post oversight by independent
commissioners an integral part of its statutory authorization for interception
ofcommunications and data. But according to thewatchdog group,JUSTICE,
the commissioners have been granted insufficient resources and powers, and
have been largely ineffective.49
That said, the concept of an independent agency or commissioner charged
with injecting privacy considerations into the framing of surveillance regula
tions, and with monitoring their implementation to safeguard against abuse,
has promise. The problem with leaving surveillance to the authorities
charged with keeping us safe is that they are institutionally likely to discount
privacy concerns. Their job is to catch criminals or to keep the nation secure;
privacy is likely to be viewed as an obstacle to this. The Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement recognizes this problem and responds by requiring the
police to convince an independent judge of the objective justifications for
their actions before intruding on an individual's privacy or liberty with a
search or seizure. The warrant process remains the gold standard for inde
pendent protection of privacy. But in those instances where prior judicial
authorization is either not possible or too costly, and particularly where ex
post lawsuits and complaints are unlikely to be effective, an independent
agency tasked with protecting the public good of privacy may provide an
important safeguard.
The US has inched in this direction with the appointment of privacy and
civil rights officers within the Department of Homeland Security. But they
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remain a part of the very agencies they are supposed to be monitoring and
therefore lack the requisite independence. Inspectors general are also an
example of monitoring, although they tend to focus on issues other than
privacy. Where, as is often the case in the national security arena, surveil
lance is routinely carried out without notice to those subject to it, some sort
of independent agency dedicated to the protection ofprivacymay be a useful
mechanism for preserving privacy in the age of sophisticated, all-encompassing,
and often secret technological surveillance.
7.5 Conclusion
Technological advances in surveillance have far outstripped the develop
ment of constitutional law in the US. The courts and the legislatures may be
fated to playing catch up. But if privacy is to be preserved, the law must
respond. Outmoded notions that whatever takes place in public cannot be
private, or that sharing information with another necessarily forfeits any
interest in preserving that information from prying government eyes, need to
be rethought. Computersmake it increasingly easy to gather massive amounts
of "unprotected" information from public arenas and private companies, and
to generate intimate portraits of citizens' desires, contacts, actions, and asso
ciations. Privacy law, if it is to retain its relevance in the modern era, must
confront this new reality.
Scholars have urged that, as privacy is increasingly squeezed out by tech
nology, Fourth Amendment protection should look elsewhere - to a consid
eration of the balance of power between police and criminals or to the use
rather than the collection of information. But comparative constitutional les
sons from other jurisdictions suggest that we need not abandon the notion of
privacy. Rather, what is needed is a more expansive definition of privacy. In
particular, redefining the invasion ofprivacy to include the use of technology to
compile comprehensive or intimate data about an individual's private life,
whatever the source of the information, would ensure that the Fourth
Amendment remains relevant as government surveillance increasingly takes
the form of accessing data gathered by private companies. So, too, once we
recognize that privacy concerns are implicated by awider range of activity than
heretofore acknowledged, wemight consider alternative mechanisms to protect
it - such as "least intrusive means" assessments, or the creation of independent
bodies charged with protecting privacy through effective oversight and par
ticipation in the framing of the rules and regulations governing surveillance.
In the end, rights protections typically grow out of experiences of abuse.
The international human rights revolution was sparked by the horrors of
World War II; the right of equal protection in the US was defined in response
to slavery, the Civil War, and Jim Crow segregation. Reform comes only
when the public demands it, and the public demands it only when abuses are
disclosed - as happened in the US in the 1970s after a congressional commit
tee headed by Senator Frank Church revealed widespread government
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spying on peace groups and civil rights activists. If the right of privacy is to
survive the challenge of the all-seeing technological eye, it will be because
citizens, enraged by stories of abusive and overly intrusive monitoring of
their own activities, insist on it.50
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